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BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO APPELLANT'S PETITION
FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
THE COURT OF APPEALS EXCORIATION OF APPELLANT'S
BRIEF WAS NOT IMPROPER.
The Appellant asserts that the Court of Appeals
unjustly and unconstitutionally critiqued his brief.
argument is irrelevant.

This

While the tenor of the Court of
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Appeals opinion shows that the judges who decided it were
not impressed with the Appellant's prose.

Their comments

on his brief did not affect his right to a fair evaluation
of the issues he raised.

There were two main headings in

the Court of Appeals opinion "Inadequacy of Appellant's
Brief" and "Merits of Appeal".

The fact that the Court of

Appeals may have been a little rough on Appellant's
counsel in their first section of its opinion has no
bearing upon the merits of the case.

The merits of the

appeal were clearly addressed in the second section where
the appellate court agreed with the trial court.

Each of

Appellant's arguments which could have by some stretch of
the imagination merited reversal were addressed and denied
in the second section of the Court of Appeals subpoena.
The Appellant's disagreement with the Court of
Appeals analysis of his brief is rooted under Rule 24(k)
of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals.

That rule

provides, "All briefs under this rule must be concise,
presented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper
headings, and free from burdensome, irrelevant,
immaterial, or scandalous matters."

The opinion of the

Court of Appeals complained that the brief was "not
concise, logically arranged, or free from burdensome
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material."

At the time this appeal was taken the contents

of briefs were governed by Rule 75(p)(2) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.

That rule used language which was not

noteably different than that contained in Rule 24 (k),
language like ". . . without redundancy or duplicity . .
. , a concise statement of material fact . . ." The
respondent's reading of the Appellant's brief shows that
it was not in compliance with Rule 75(p)(2) anymore than
it was in compliance with Rule 24(k).
THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY RULED ON THE MERITS
OF THE CASE.
In his brief in support of his Petition for
Certiorari the Appellant argues at length concerning the
rules pertaining to attachments and garnishments and to
the appropriate burdens for service of each.

The trial

court found, and the record very clearly supports, the
fact that Appellant's service was inadequate.

Appellant

relied upon service upon one Keith Vreeken that the
evidence adduced at trial, eye witnesses presented by the
Appellant, was that Mr. Vreeken was not an officer,
managing agent, general agent or any other agent
authorized to receive service for any relevant defendant.
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The Trial Court and the Court of Appeals each found
that even if there was a defect in the respondent's
service of the pre-judgment Writ of Attachment, that
defect was cured by the Respondent's service of a
post-judgment Writ of Garnishment on the Garnishee,
Deseret Bank.

By the time the post-judgment Writ of

Attachment was served by the Respondent the Appellant's
pre-judgment Writ had expired.
Appellant's reliance upon Employer's Mutual of
Wausau v. Montrose Steel Co., 559 P.2d 536 (Utah 1976) is
misplaced.

Montrose Steel and its predecessor, Bristol v.

Brandt, 36 Utah 2d 108 103 P 1076 (1909) each dealt with
jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant.

The

Defendants in the instant case were residents.
Further it should be noted that Appellant did not
raise the in rem/in personam issue in the Court of
Appeals.
The Appellant argues at page 14 of his brief in
support of his Petition for Writ of Certiorari that the
Vreekens were before the Court.

He supports this by the

fact that they made a general appearance in Rone's case.
Unfortunately, Rone's case is not the case before the
Court.

The case before the Court is Demetropolous v.
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Vreeken.

The fact that Vreekens felt compelled to appear

in Rone v. Vreeken does not mean that they were parties to
the action which spawned to this case.
DATED this

_^T^ay of July, 1988.

'TLDE<
>y for Respondents
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I caused four true and correct
copies of the foregoing Brief in Opposition to Appellant's
Petition for Writ of Certiorari to be deposited in the
United States Mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the
following:
George M. McCune
McCUNE, McCUNE & SUZUKI
Suite 11, 1399 South 700 East
P.O. Box 520561
Salt Lake City, Utah 84152
on this

^

^

day of July, 1988.

-5-

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
OOOoo
Dale and Kathy Demetropoulos,
Plaintiffs#
v.
Fred Vreeken, et al.,

OPINION
(For Publication)

Defendants,
Deseret Bank,
Garnishee.
No.

860031-CA

B. J. Rone,
Plaintiff in Intervention
and Appellant,

FILED

v.
Dale and Kathy Demetropoulos,
Defendants in Intervention
and Respondents.

Time
Off**-

Before Judges Orme, Jackson and Billings.

ORME, Judge:
This case involves a dispute over the validity of
respondents' prejudgment writ of attachment and the priority of
appellant's prejudgment writ of garnishment. Despite the
inadequacy of appellant's brief, we reach the merits of his
appeal and affirm.
INADEQUACY OF APPELLANT'S BRIEF
While numerous issues are raised on appeal, appellant's
brief has not been of much help to the court in disposing of

the case before it. 1 The purpose of a brief is to enlighten
the court and elucidate the issues rather than confuse the
court and obscure the issues.2 In this respect, one court
has observed that H[i]f the court is not supplied with the
proper tools to decide cases, then extremely valuable time,
already severely rationed, must be diverted from substantive
work- into less productive tasks. Kushner v. Winterthur Swiss
Ins. Co., 620 F.2d 404, 407 (3d Cir. 1980).
Counsel should be aware that appellate courts are
beginning to overcome their trepidation about dismissing
appeals and imposing sanctions for failure to comply with these
procedures. For example, the court in Kushner, while
acknowledging the -institutional- and -precedential- impact of
its decision, found that counsel's -refusal, failure or
unwillingness to master [the court's] procedures'' necessarily
required dismissal of the appeal and imposition of sanctions
for failure to file an appendix in conformity with court
rules. Ifi. at 407. More recently, this court chose to
disregard an inadequate brief and premised its affirmance, in
part, on the failure of the brief to comply with our rules.
Koulis v. Standard Oil Co., 746 P.2d 1182, 1185 (Utah Ct. App.
1987) .
The Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals set forth the
general requirements to be observed by litigants bringing

1. "Inadequate appellate briefs which do not significantly
assist the Court in disposing of the case before it have proven
to be a significant problem. In order to alleviate this
concern, this Rule clearly specifies the required contents and
order of each brief.- Utah R. App. P. 24 advisory committee
note. See Note 3, infra.
2. "It may be said that a brief is as effective as it is
helpful in deciding the question or questions presented.
Hence, the crucial importance of properly phrasing or stating
the question or issue raised on the appeal cannot be
overemphasized. By a proper presentation of pertinent
authority, counsel should demonstrate and persuade the court
that the answer submitted in the brief is warranted, if not
absolutely required, by the governing principles of law.- Re,
Effective Legal Writing and the Appellate Brief, Case &
Comment, July-Aug. 1984, at 9, 18.
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appeals in this court. Rule 24(k) 3 requires that all briefs
-be concise, presented with accuracy, logically arranged with
proper headings, and free from burdensome, irrelevant,
immaterial or scandalous matters.- While appellant's brief is
free from "scandalous matters,- it is not concise, logically
arranged, or free from burdensome material.
Appellantfs brief begins with a laborious, ten-page
Statement of Facts. The statement of facts is little more than
a catalogue of each pleading and paper generated by the parties
or the court, regardless of how inconsequential it might be, and
accordingly the statement is burdened with minutia. The
statement of facts contains unhelpful citations to the
thousand-plus page record, such as -See pleading entitled
Pre-Judgment Writ of Garnishment with answers to interrogatories
dated April 25, 1983, in the court file- and -See entire court
file, + R169.- Confusion is engendered in this multiparty case
by inconsistent references to the parties—sometimes by their
names, sometimes by their designation at trial, and sometimes by
their designation on appeal. See R. Utah Ct. App. 24(d).
The substance of appellant's first of nine points,
mercifully reduced from some twenty identified in his docketing
statement, is obscured within the 135 words it takes to make
3. Although our citations are to Rule 24 of the Rules of the
Utah Court of Appeals, effective January 13, 1987, that rule
does not differ from Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, effective January 1, 1985. While it is true that
appellant's brief was filed a few weeks before the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure went into effect, it is also true that the
problems inherent in the transition from the prior rules to the
new appellate rules were anticipated. It was intended that
-unless there is substantial prejudice in a particular case
which results from the application of or compliance with these
Rules, the Rules shall govern as of the effective date, all
appellate procedure . . . including cases presently in
process.- Utah R. App. P., introductory note of Supreme Court
Advisory Committee on the Rules of Appellate Procedure. While
the new rules were not effective until January 1985, they were
prepared in draft form and circulated among the bar for comment
and information well in advance of their effective date.
We acknowledge that under former Utah R. Civ. P. 75(p),
which was in effect when appellant's brief was filed, the
requirements for briefing were phrased somewhat differently.
Nonetheless, even under that rule appellant's brief is deficient.
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it. Point I, by no means unique among appellant's points, is
captioned as follows:
DEMETROPOULOS* PRE-JUDGMENT WRIT OF
ATTACHMENT AND PROCEEDINGS THEREON WERE
SUBSTANTIVELY INCORRECT AND VOID BECAUSE
THE WRIT AND PROCEEDINGS THEREON WERE
UNAMENDABLY DEFECTIVE BECAUSE A RETURN AND
INVENTORY WAS NOT FILED FOR 7 MONTHS
INSTEAD OF WITHIN 20 DAYS AS REQUIRED BY
RULE 64C(h), A DETAILED INVENTORY WAS NOT
FILED AS REQUIRED BY RULE 64C(h), THE
SERVING OFFICER FAILED TO ASK FOR A
MEMORANDUM OF CREDITS ATTACHED AS REQUIRED
BY RULE 64C(h), NO DEFENDANTS WERE SERVED
WITH PLEADINGS WITHIN 10 DAYS OF ISSUANCE
OF THE PRE-JUDGMENT ATTACHMENT IN A WAY
ALLOWED BY RULE 4, AND THE WRIT THEREFORE
AUTOMATICALLY DIED A JUDICIAL DEATH AT THE
END OF ITS 10-DAY LIFE, AND GARNISHMENT
UNDER RULE 64D WAS THE APPROPRIATE WRIT TO
ISSUE TO LIEN PROPERTY IN THE HANDS OF
THIRD PARTIES RATHER THAN ATTACHMENT UNDER
RULE 64C.
When Point I is dissected, it obviously concerns several issues.
The argument under Point I is a disjointed presentation of
abstract legal doctrines pertaining to garnishment and
attachment. Cases are quoted and checklists from legal
encyclopedias provided, with scant attention given to the facts
of the instant matter and no actual analysis of those facts in
light of the legal authorities excerpted. Appellant invites us
to draw what he apparently regards as obvious conclusions, ending
the argument under Point I with: "In the instant case, the
Pre-judgment Writ of Attachment of Respondents can not have
survived all of the above defects. The cites to the record made
in the Statement of Facts above clearly shows that." Difficulty
in following the argument is compounded by the lack of a summary
of arguments as required by Rule 24(a)(8).4
4. Rule 24(a)(8), Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, requires
the brief of appellant to contain "[a] summary of arguments. The
summary of arguments, suitably paragraphed, shall be a succinct
condensation of the arguments actually made in the body of the
brief. It shall not be a mere repetition of the heading under
which the argument is arranged."
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We concede that not every brief filed is in strict
compliance with our rules. Nor is every brief we see, any more
than every opinion we write, a masterpiece of legal writing.
Ordinarily, however, the briefs do enable us to understand, with
varying degrees of effort, what particular errors were allegedly
made, where in the record those errors can be found, and why,
under applicable authorities, those errors are material ones
necessitating reversal or other relief.5 While appellant's
task has no doubt been complicated by the convoluted procedural
posture of the case, appellant's brief fails to give us much help
in finding the keys to understanding it.6
Under Rule 24(k), briefs which are not in compliance with
the requirements of our rule or are otherwise inadequate may be
disregarded or stricken by the court and attorney fees can be
imposed. Sympathetic to the Kushner court's view that "[w]e can
no longer afford the effort and time to prepare counsels' case
and to supply counsels' record deficiencies," 620 F.2d at 407

(quoting United States v. Sorcers, 552 F.2d 108, 115 (3d cir.
1977)), when this time can be "better spent in considering the
merits of cases that are presented to us in proper form," 620
F.2d at 407, we have considered dealing with the brief in one of
the ways provided in Rule 24(k). While we can be expected to
become less timid in this regard over time — and as we recognize
that a brief which fails to do its job is, in a sense, its own
sanction — we decline to impose Rule 24(k) sanctions in this
case and turn to the merits of the appeal.'
5. Judge Re has noted in this respect that "it is counsel's
responsibility to point out the error and to demonstrate that it
was reversible because it affected the substantial rights of the
appellant." Re, Effective Legal Writing and the Appellate Brief,
Case and Comment, July-Aug. 1984, at 9, 18.
6. Our confusion might have been alleviated through oral
argument, but no request was made pursuant to R. Utah Ct. App.
29(b) and no argument held. Nor did appellant submit a reply
brief which might also have clarified the issues.
7. This approach is not inconsistent with this court's
disposition of Koulis v. Standard Oil Co., 746 P.2d 1182 (Utah
Ct. App. 1987). In Koulis, a unanimous panel found appellant's
brief inadequate under Rule 24 and therefore determined to "sua
sponte disregard Koulis' brief on appeal. We also assume the
correctness of the judgment below, and find that Katherine Koulis
. . . has failed to come forward with any legally cognizable
reason to excuse her delayed discovery of the alleged fraud.M
Id. at 1185. Nonetheless, the panel was apparently not
comfortable in premising its affirmance solely on that ground and
went on to conclude that affirmance was also warranted on statute
of limitation grounds. Id. at 1185-86.
860031-CA
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MERITS OF APPEAL
Appellant has set forth various -facts" in his brief. He
has not, however, "marshal[led] all the evidence in support of
the trial court's findings and then demonstrated] that even
viewing it in the light most favorable to the court below, the
evidence is insufficient to support the findings." Scharf v.
BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). Accordingly, "we
take as our starting point the trial court's findings** and
not [appellant's] recitation of the facts." Id.
Respondents Dale and Kathy Demotropolous filed their
action against various defendants and obtained a prejudgment
writ of attachment. The same was served on Deseret Bank on
April 12, 1983, as Deseret Bank held certain accounts in the
names of some of the defendants. Appellant B. J. Rone, a
creditor of some or all of these same defendants, then filed
his own civil action and obtained a prejudgment writ of
garnishment. He served the bank eleven days later. Before
respondents' writ expired, it was extended twice, the second
time indefinitely, "pending a request by the Defendants to have
the matter heard." Respondents obtained judgment by default
against defendants and, in execution of the judgment, promptly
served the bank with a post-judgment writ of garnishment.
Appellant obtained a default judgment in the action he filed a
few weeks later.
Appellant intervened in the action respondents filed to
assert his entitlement to the accounts.^ Intervention was
8. We do so only insofar as the findings of fact, found both
in the court's memorandum decision and its formal "Findings of
Fact," are really that. Some of the "facts" set forth in the
findings, prepared by respondents' counsel, are actually
conclusions of law or else so broadly phrased as to be
unhelpful. Finding #3, for example, reads as follows: "That
the Plaintiffs' Prejudgment Writ of Attachment was
substantively and procedurally proper and correct in all
relevant respects."
9. Appellant and respondents were victims of the same
investment scam. It is regrettable that, having both succeeded
in finding a liquid asset of defendants at about the same time,
they were unable to devise an equitable method of sharing the
prize' rather than engaging in a costly, "winner-take-all"
contest. Astoundingly, in view of the modest size of the
garnished accounts and amounts invested, their procedural
battles generated some seven hundred pages in court filings.

860031-CA

6

denied by the district court, but was subsequently permitted
pursuant to a writ of mandamus issued by the Utah Supreme
Court. Appellant's initial foray into the action was
subsequently nullified because of his failure to comply with
Utah R. Civ. P. 24(c) following issuance of the writ of
mandamus. Various papers filed by him were stricken by court
order because he had not first filed a complaint in
intervention and paid the necessary filing fee. These
oversights were ultimately corrected. The ancillary proceeding
which was begun with appellant's complaint in intervention
ultimately culminated in a judgment dismissing that complaint.
It is from that judgment that appellant Rone appeals.
Appellant claims priority to the accounts in question due
to various alleged deficiencies in connection with respondents1
prejudgment writ of attachment. Respondents strive to
demonstrate that their prejudgment writ was proper in every
material respect, but also attack the validity of appellant's
prejudgment writ of garnishment and his default judgment.
Their basic position is that even if their prejudgment writ was
flawed, appellant's has come to have no force or effect,
leaving respondents' post-judgment writ of garnishment the
first, clearly valid levy on the accounts held by Deseret Bank.
The trial court's findings support the conclusion that
appellant's prejudgment writ of garnishment does not have
precedence over respondents* post-judgment writ of garnishment,
making it unnecessary for us to decide whether respondents'
prejudgment writ of attachment was valid.
Appellant purported to serve the defendants he named in
his action, including the defendants whose accounts were
garnished, by service upon one Keith Vreeken, who was not
himself named as a defendant.10 However, the court noted in
its memorandum decision that "[n]o proof exists in the record
other than the constable's guess that Keith Vreeken was the
agent of or had any managerial control for the business
entities'* whose accounts were seized. The court formally found
10. Appellant named as defendants Kurt Vreeken, an individual,
doing business under various assumed names; Fred Vreeken, an
individual, doing business under those same names; "business
entities" corresponding to Kurt and Fred Vreeken's assumed
names; John Andrews, Rick Ramsey and Jerry Pitts, under various
assumed names; Financial Development Group, a business entity;
and "several John Does, whose names are not yet known." The
Deseret Bank accounts stood in the names under which Kurt and
Fred Vreeken allegedly did business.
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that Keith Vreeken was not "an officer, managing agent, general
agent or any other agent authorized to receive service for any
relevant Defendant herein nor that he was a clerk, cashier,
chief clerk [or] person having the management, direction or
control of any property of any such Defendant.- There is
adequate support in the record for this finding. The
defendants in question were found to be "sole proprietorships,not corporations, and no assumed name certificates or filings
of any sort had been made concerning them. Thus, no public
record showed that Keith Vreeken was registered agent for them
or otherwise affiliated with them. The bank's representative
testified that Keith Vreeken was not on the signature cards for
the accounts, although others with that same last name
apparently were. 1 1
Appellant disputes the finding concerning Keith Vreeken*s
status, but also contends that any problems with his service of
process on the defendants are inconsequential since service of
his prejudgment writ of garnishment was duly made on the bank.
This fact does not save appellant. A prejudgment writ of
garnishment is a provisional remedy only, "available as a means
of attachment of intangible property . . . before judgment, in
cases in which a writ of attachment is available under Rule
64C." Utah R. Civ. P. 64D(a)(i). Such a prejudgment writ
merely commands the garnishee to retain the property "until
further order of the court." Utah R. Civ. P. 64D(e)(i). Only
if the plaintiff ultimately obtains a valid judgment against
the defendant is he or she entitled to some or all of the
provisionally garnished property.12 See Utah R. Civ. P.
64D(j). £££ also Utah R. Civ. P. 64C(k).
In this case, the court properly concluded that the
default judgment obtained by appellant in the action he filed
was invalid for lack of jurisdiction due to the insufficiency
of service of process on the defendants in that action. The
provisional remedy of a prejudgment writ of garnishment in that
same action ceased to have any further effect upon entry of
11. It is worth noting that one of them, Kurt Vreeken, had
been served by the constable used by appellant on at least one
prior occasion.
12. " [Garnishment to enforce a final judgment should be
distinguished from the provisional remedy of garnishment before
trial, which is aimed at preserving assets of the debtor until
a final decision can be had on the merits." D. Dobbs, Remedies
11 (1973) .
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that -judgment"13 and could be properly disregarded by the
court in determining who was entitled to the accounts/ leaving
respondents entitled to the accounts pursuant to their
post-judgment writ of garnishment.
One further point raised by appellant merits comment.
Appellant contends that the court erred in not granting his
post-trial motion to amend the return of service on Keith
Vreeken. It is suggested that if the return were amended, it
would demonstrate that service on the defendants was actually
proper, meaning appellant's judgment was valid and his
prejudgment writ entitled to recognition. We are not
persuaded. Any error in disallowing the amendment was harmless
since the constable testified at length concerning the
circumstances of service on Keith Vreeken. Accordingly, all
relevant information was before the court anyway. Moreover, we
find it difficult to see how appellant can complain in this
appeal about a ruling on a motion that would have been properly
raised, if at all, in another action, namely the one he brought
and in which the return was filed.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed.

rySK. COrme, Judge
GregoryTC.

I CONCUR;

Judith M. Billings, Judge

13. As provided in Rule 64A, appellant's prejudgment writ of
garnishment recited that it would expire in ten days from
issuance unless extended. Utah R. Civ. P. 64A(3). Defendants
did not appear at the hearing on whether the writ should be
continued and, accordingly, by order entered at that hearing,
the writ was continued "in full force and effect during the
pendency [of appellant's action] or until further order of the
court. M
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JACKSON, Judge (concurring):
By virtue of random case assignment, the burden of trying
to make sense of the appellants' briefs in this case and in
Koulis v. Standard Oil Co., 746 P.2d 1182 (Utah App. 1987), was
cast upon me. No other judge of this court was honored with
that dubious distinction. And I admit the likely existence of
a cumulative effect upon me. In both cases, we have proceeded
to decide the merits of the issues raised, in deference only to
the parties and not to appellants' counsel. Charles Dickens
said that one member of Parliament had a tolerable command of
sentences with no meaning in them. Appellate counsel must
prepare and submit briefs that are more than mere sound
effects. The time will most assuredly arrive when a panel of
this court will be constrained to disregard intolerable and
unacceptable briefs and not reach the merits of the case.

Norman H. Jackson,
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